สืบเนื่องจากข่าวผู้สื่อข่าวประจำภูมิภาคเอเชียของบีบีซี ถูกแจ้งจับข้อหาหมิ่นเบื้องสูง ตามประมวลกฎหมายอาญา มาตรา 112 พร้อมคณะกรรมการสมาคมผู้สื่อข่าวต่างประเทศแห่งประเทศไทย (FCCT) สืบเนื่องจากการดำเนินงานสัมมนาหัวข้อ Coup, Capital and Crown ซึ่งจัดขึ้นเมื่อวันที่ 13 ธ.ค. 2550 รายงานข่าวในประชาไทระบุว่า “งานสัมมนาของสมาคมผู้สื่อข่าวต่างประเทศฯ หัวข้อ Coup, Capital and Crown หรือ ‘ทหาร, ทุนนิยม และกษัตริย์’ – ซึ่งในที่นี้หมายถึง ‘สำนักงานทรัพย์สินส่วนพระมหากษัตริย์’ เป็นวงเสวนาเกี่ยวกับหนังสือ 2 เล่ม คือ Thai Capital after the 1997 Crises ซึ่ง ดร.ผาสุก พงษ์ไพจิตร ร่วมเขียนกับ คริส เบเกอร์ และ Journal of Contemporary Asia Special: The Thailand Coup ซึ่งเควิน ฮิววิสัน และไมเคิล คอนเนอร์เป็นบรรณาธิการร่วมกัน” …
ผู้เขียนคิดว่า Journal of Contemporary Asia Special: The Thailand Coup ซึ่งรวบรวมบทความ 10 ชิ้น เกี่ยวกับเมืองไทยหลังรัฐประหาร น่าจะเป็นประโยชน์ต่อทุกท่านที่ติดตามบล็อกนี้ จึงอยากเผยแพร่โดยทั่วกัน (คลิ้กที่รูปหรือที่ลิ้งก์ข้างล่างเพื่อดาวน์โหลด):
Click here to download Journal of Contemporary Asia Special: The Thailand Coup [ZIP format containing 10 PDF files]
ของแถม: Craig Reynolds on Paul Handley’s The King Never Smiles [PDF, copied from this page at New Mandala]
Excerpts from each article in the JCA file:
Introduction: Thailand and the ‘‘Good Coup’’
by Michael Connors and Kevin Hewison
This volume presents an attempt to understand the Thaksin ascendancy, its ideological, class and institutional base, the oppositional movements that took shape against it, and the forces that eventually overthrew it. These stories are not a seamless linear narrative, and we hope that this collection will give rise to further work that attempts to unravel the political dynamics of the Thai social formation.
Toppling Democracy
by Thongchai Winichakul
Thailand’s 2006 royalist coup is best understood by reference to the historical context of democratisation. The dominant historiography of Thai democratisation is either a simplistic liberal view of anti-military democracy or a royalist one that is ultimately antidemocratic. This article offers a serial history of democratisation that allows us to see the long duration of layered historical processes. As democratisation is fundamentally a break from the centralised absolute monarchy, the monarchy and the monarchists, despite their up and down political fortunes, have probably played the most significant role in shaping Thai democracy since 1932. Despite that, their role and place in history has been overlooked due to the perception that they are ‘‘above politics.’’ This article argues that, since 1973 in particular, the monarchists have assumed the status of the superior realm in Thai politics that claims the high moral ground above politicians and normal politics. With distaste for electoral politics, and in tacit collaboration with the so-called people’s sector, activists and intellectuals, they have undermined electoral democracy in the name of ‘‘clean politics’’ versus the corruption of politicians. The 2006 coup that toppled democracy was the latest effort of the monarchists to take control of the democratisation process.
The 2006 Anti-Thaksin Movement in Thailand: An Analysis
by Oliver Pye and Wolfram Schaffar
This article examines the mass protests against Thailand’s billionaire Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006. Over a series of several months, hundreds of thousands of people took part in demonstrations that created a deep political crisis and forced Thaksin to call snap elections. This political crisis was partly a result of intra-elite conflict between the old power elite and Thaksin’s ‘‘CEO-style’’ rule, which opened up space for a broader politicisation. However, a closer look at Thaksin’s own mass support and a comparison of his populism with Venezuela’s President Chavez leads us to the analysis that the crisis resulted from deeper contradictions within Thaksin’s ‘‘post neo-liberal’’ capitalist restructuring project. The movement against Thaksin thus drew on and brought together different sections of Thai society rebelling against Free Trade Agreements, privatisation and authoritarian, corporate-dominated politics. The article concludes with some reflections on the movement and the question of royal intervention and the coup d’etat.
สืบเนื่องจากข่าวผู้สื่อข่าวประจำภูมิภาคเอเชียของบีบีซี ถูกแจ้งจับข้อหาหมิ่นเบื้องสูง ตามประมวลกฎหมายอาญา มาตรา 112 พร้อมคณะกรรมการสมาคมผู้สื่อข่าวต่างประเทศแห่งประเทศไทย (FCCT) สืบเนื่องจากการดำเนินงานสัมมนาหัวข้อ Coup, Capital and Crown ซึ่งจัดขึ้นเมื่อวันที่ 13 ธ.ค. 2550 รายงานข่าวในประชาไทระบุว่า “งานสัมมนาของสมาคมผู้สื่อข่าวต่างประเทศฯ หัวข้อ Coup, Capital and Crown หรือ ‘ทหาร, ทุนนิยม และกษัตริย์’ – ซึ่งในที่นี้หมายถึง ‘สำนักงานทรัพย์สินส่วนพระมหากษัตริย์’ เป็นวงเสวนาเกี่ยวกับหนังสือ 2 เล่ม คือ Thai Capital after the 1997 Crises ซึ่ง ดร.ผาสุก พงษ์ไพจิตร ร่วมเขียนกับ คริส เบเกอร์ และ Journal of Contemporary Asia Special: The Thailand Coup ซึ่งเควิน ฮิววิสัน และไมเคิล คอนเนอร์เป็นบรรณาธิการร่วมกัน” …
ผู้เขียนคิดว่า Journal of Contemporary Asia Special: The Thailand Coup ซึ่งรวบรวมบทความ 10 ชิ้น เกี่ยวกับเมืองไทยหลังรัฐประหาร น่าจะเป็นประโยชน์ต่อทุกท่านที่ติดตามบล็อกนี้ จึงอยากเผยแพร่โดยทั่วกัน (คลิ้กที่รูปหรือที่ลิ้งก์ข้างล่างเพื่อดาวน์โหลด):
Click here to download Journal of Contemporary Asia Special: The Thailand Coup [ZIP format containing 10 PDF files]
ของแถม: Craig Reynolds on Paul Handley’s The King Never Smiles [PDF, copied from this page at New Mandala]
Excerpts from each article in the JCA file:
Introduction: Thailand and the ‘‘Good Coup’’
by Michael Connors and Kevin Hewison
This volume presents an attempt to understand the Thaksin ascendancy, its ideological, class and institutional base, the oppositional movements that took shape against it, and the forces that eventually overthrew it. These stories are not a seamless linear narrative, and we hope that this collection will give rise to further work that attempts to unravel the political dynamics of the Thai social formation.
Toppling Democracy
by Thongchai Winichakul
Thailand’s 2006 royalist coup is best understood by reference to the historical context of democratisation. The dominant historiography of Thai democratisation is either a simplistic liberal view of anti-military democracy or a royalist one that is ultimately antidemocratic. This article offers a serial history of democratisation that allows us to see the long duration of layered historical processes. As democratisation is fundamentally a break from the centralised absolute monarchy, the monarchy and the monarchists, despite their up and down political fortunes, have probably played the most significant role in shaping Thai democracy since 1932. Despite that, their role and place in history has been overlooked due to the perception that they are ‘‘above politics.’’ This article argues that, since 1973 in particular, the monarchists have assumed the status of the superior realm in Thai politics that claims the high moral ground above politicians and normal politics. With distaste for electoral politics, and in tacit collaboration with the so-called people’s sector, activists and intellectuals, they have undermined electoral democracy in the name of ‘‘clean politics’’ versus the corruption of politicians. The 2006 coup that toppled democracy was the latest effort of the monarchists to take control of the democratisation process.
The 2006 Anti-Thaksin Movement in Thailand: An Analysis
by Oliver Pye and Wolfram Schaffar
This article examines the mass protests against Thailand’s billionaire Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006. Over a series of several months, hundreds of thousands of people took part in demonstrations that created a deep political crisis and forced Thaksin to call snap elections. This political crisis was partly a result of intra-elite conflict between the old power elite and Thaksin’s ‘‘CEO-style’’ rule, which opened up space for a broader politicisation. However, a closer look at Thaksin’s own mass support and a comparison of his populism with Venezuela’s President Chavez leads us to the analysis that the crisis resulted from deeper contradictions within Thaksin’s ‘‘post neo-liberal’’ capitalist restructuring project. The movement against Thaksin thus drew on and brought together different sections of Thai society rebelling against Free Trade Agreements, privatisation and authoritarian, corporate-dominated politics. The article concludes with some reflections on the movement and the question of royal intervention and the coup d’etat.
Thaksin’s Populism
by Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker
Thaksin Shinawatra was not a populist when he rose to power in 2001, but became so in intensifying stages over the next five years. His populism went beyond redistributive policies to include rhetorical rejection of Thailand’s political elite, and denigration of liberal democracy in favour of personalised authoritarianism. Fears provoked by this populism helped to mobilise the urban middle-class rejection of Thaksin which was background to the 2006 coup. Thaksin’s populism was a response to the demands and insecurities of the large informal mass created by an outward-orientated strategy of development. Thaksin’s populism resembles the neo-populism prevalent in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. Also like these regimes, Thaksin made no investment in mass organisation, and fell precipitately when subject to elite attack. In Latin America, this phase has been superseded by leaders with a more ideological message and greater investment in organisation.
The Rural Constitution and the Everyday Politics of Elections in Northern Thailand
by Andrew Walker
The Thai coup of 19 September 2006 derived ideological legitimacy from the view that the Thaksin government’s electoral mandate was illegitimate because it had been ‘‘bought’’ from an unsophisticated and easily manipulated electorate. There is nothing new about this argument, nor its use in justifying military interference. Political commentators have asserted regularly that the Thai populace lacks the basic characteristics essential for a modern democratic citizenry. Accounts of the deficiencies of rural voters often focus on their parochialism, their lack of political sophistication, the vulnerability to vote buying and the influence of electoral canvassers (hua khanaen). This article challenges this negative portrayal of rural electoral culture. Drawing on ethnographic field work in northern Thailand, it is argued that the everyday politics of elections is informed by a range of different electoral values that shape judgements about legitimate, and illegitimate, political power in electoral contexts. These local values can be usefully thought of as comprising a ‘‘rural constitution.’’
The Thai Rak Thai Party and Elections in North-eastern Thailand
by Somchai Phatharathananunth
Thaksin Shinawatra’s electoral success, through the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, has led to a debate: was the party’s electoral landslide based on the appeal of its policies or the power of money? On one side of the debate, the party’s success was seen to result from its policies that reflected the interests of widely divergent sectors of the electorate. On the other side, TRT was held to be no different from ‘‘old-style’’ political parties that relied on money politics (vote buying, buying members of parliament and other kinds of patronage). This article explores the nature of TRT’s successes and failures by examining the operation of TRT in north-eastern Thailand. It is argued that it is wrong to single out policies or money as a source of TRT’s success because the party relied on both strategies to win elections.
A Different Coup d’Etat?
by Ukrist Pathmanand
The 2006 coup d’etat was far more than a simple case of military seizure of power. Rather, the 19 September 2006 coup is connected intimately with the monarchy in various respects. The ‘‘royalist military’’ legitimated the coup by using the royalist discourse that was generated by the anti-Thaksin movement and the massive celebrations of the king’s 60th year on the throne. Having succeeded in overthrowing prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the coup makers thought they could secure the throne by ensuring loyal succession to the position of Army Commander-in-Chief in the medium term. To enhance military influence the ‘‘royal military’’ are also revitalising a Cold War relic, the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). In line with this political regression, it appears that military want to return Thailand to the years of ‘‘semi-democracy,’’ when the military and bureaucracy had significant power over elected politicians.
Article of Faith: The Failure of Royal Liberalism in Thailand
by Michael Connors
Calls for ‘‘royal intervention’’ to end the political crisis that wracked Thailand in 2006 were consistent with the disposition of Thai liberalism. The apparent paradox of liberals seeking a seemingly extra-constitutional solution to end the popular rule of Thaksin Shinawatra’s government stems from the agnosticism of liberalism to majoritarian democracy. The specific challenges that emerged as a consequence of Thaksin’s rise led liberals to mobilise royalist ideas to withstand Thaksin’s assault on the liberally conceived 1997 Constitution. Key among these ideas was the notion of sovereignty as expressed in the relationship between the monarch and the people, or rachaprachasamasai. The failure of ‘‘royal liberalism’’ to bring an end to the crisis, may signal a more general failure of royal liberalism to secure political order in the future.
The Crown Property Bureau in Thailand and the Crisis of 1997
by Porphant Ouyyanont
The Crown Property Bureau is the monarchy’s investment arm in Thailand. While the monarchy’s political role has been much discussed since the 2006 coup, its economic foundations, activities and role have seldom been studied. To understand these aspects better, this article looks at how the 1997 crisis affected the Crown Property Bureau. The Bureau was particularly vulnerable because of its dependence on the performance of two private companies in which the Bureau was a major shareholder. Both companies, the Siam Commercial Bank and the Siam Cement Group, were in sectors that were hit hard by the crisis. The Bureau survived the crisis by making significant changes in its own management and investment policies, and by promoting similar reforms in two affiliated companies. As a result, the Bureau emerged with an income significantly higher than its peak pre-crisis level.
Review: A Book, the King and the 2006 Coup
by Kevin Hewison
This article involves an assessment of Paul Handley’s important book, The King Never Smiles. A Biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej. The article begins with a discussion of the supposed threat the book posed to the monarchy and outlines the attempts to prevent publication. It then outlines Handley’s evaluation of the involvement of King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s palace in Thailand’s modern politics. It uses this approach as a way to examine the clash of elites within Thailand’s ruling class that led to a royalist campaign against the Thaksin Shinawatra government and the 2006 military coup.